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Abstract: The spill-over of the global fi nancial crisis has uncovered the weak-
nesses in the governance of the EMU. As one of the most open economies in Eu-
rope, Hungary has suff ered from the ups and downs of the global and European 
crisis and its mismanagement. Domestic policy blunders have complicated the 
situation. This paper examines how Hungary has withstood the ups and downs of 
the eurozone crisis. It also addresses the questions of whether the country has con-
verged with or diverged from the EMU membership, whether joining the EMU is 
still a good idea for Hungary, and whether the measures to ward off  the crisis have 
actually helped to face the challenge of growth.
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General remarks
Th e crisis of the management of the European Monetary system has 
become one of the hottest topics in the aft ermath of the global fi nan-
cial crisis. While in the pre-crisis period conventional wisdom held the 
EU to be a safe haven, well-equipped to protect its members from ex-
ternal shocks, the procrastination of both national crisis and EU-level 
crisis management raised doubts against this insight. Sceptical voices, 
conventionally associated with the Anglo-American mainstream of the 
economics profession, spread into continental Europe and policy-mak-
ing alike.
In this short essay we investigate how Hungary has withstood the 
ups and downs of the eurozone crisis. We pose the question of whether 
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the country has converged with or diverged from the EMU member-
ship, which was taken upon as a contractual obligation in the accession 
agreement of December 2002. We may also ask if joining in the EMU 
is still a good idea for Hungary; furthermore, it is asked if the measures 
implemented to ward off  the crisis have helped to face the challenge of 
growth.
1. Caught in the storm, longer than ever thought
In 2008 Hungary has just come out of a period of external adjustment 
triggered by the fast growth of external debt and the need to curtail the 
explosion of fi scal defi cit. On its own, Hungary’s debt/GDP ratio at the 
end of 2007 was been exorbitant – 67% of GDP, just above the average 
of the eurozone’s 66.3% – but the trend was clearly unsustainable and 
showed no convergence to the Maastricht criterion of 60%. It was all the 
more disquieting as the starting point in 2001 had been slightly below 
52% and thus the most important criterion was missed just at the time 
when GDP growth was over 4.5% in the entire decade1.
Having managed the external adjustment in 2006-2007, the overall 
expectation in Hungary was that of recovery. Recovery was seen as qua-
si-automatic given the favourable global conditions2. But the writing al-
ready appeared on the wall. Following the collapse of the British invest-
ment bank Northern Rock in June 2007, basically all informed analysts 
knew that we were sitting on a volcano. It was to erupt, the question be-
ing not if, but when. However, the decision-makers of the period3 con-
sidered the subprime crisis as a basically intra-US aff air. As they put it, 
the tornado marches on a diff erent root and Europe is touched only by 
its rim.
1 Source (unless otherwise indicated): ECB Statistics Pocket Book, Frankfurt am Main, June 
2012.
2 For details see: L. Csaba: Hungary: the Janus-faced success story of transition, [in:] A. Fosu 
(ed.), Developmental Success: Historical Accounts from More Advanced Countries, Oxford, Ox-
ford University Press, 2012, pp. 252-277.
3 J. Király, A tornádó és a hurrikán – a 2007.év válságos hatásai [The tornado and the hurricane 
– the crisis-ridden year of 2007], [in:] L. Muraközy (ed.), A jelen a jövő múltja [Present is the 
past of future], Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 2009, pp. 295-332.
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Furthermore, the Socialist government was intent to showboth the 
domestic and external audiences that the crisis was over. Th erefore the 
fi scal plan for 2009 was formulated in an extremely optimistic man-
ner, in terms of growth and fi nancing. Submitting a  fi scal plan based 
on a 3% growth forecast for 2009 in October, weeks aft er the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, was asking for trouble. And external markets did 
react swift ly, attacking the exchange rate in an aggressive manner. Th e 
collapse could only be averted by a blitz stand-by loan, orchestrated to-
gether by the IMF, the EU and the World Bank. Both its size – €20bn 
– and the involvement of the Washington Twins in managing the aff airs 
of a respectable EU member-state constituted major innovations for the 
period.
In other words, economic policies from the minute of agreeing to 
the bailout were subordinated to meeting quantitative targets of debt 
servicing, irrespective of any other broader considerations. Th e care-
taker Bajnai government was eminently fi t to manage this task. While 
cultivating the image of technocratic managers – not unfamiliar for the 
post-transition Left  – they were supported by the Socialists only and by 
two centrist parties, rightly fearing early elections. All in all, the admin-
istration did not have to care about socio-political concerns, while the 
centre-right opposition Fidesz did not have to care much about eco-
nomic exigencies and could put the entire blame for suff ering on the 
Left .
Th e price to be paid in the second half of the electoral cycle when 
governing parties refused to step down despite their loss of legitimacy4, 
was heavy. In 2009, the GDP dropped by 6.9%, the debt ratio jumped 
to 72.9%, unemployment jumped to 10% against barely over 7% in the 
preceding period. Oddly enough for a  contracting economy, infl ation 
remained at 4% (HICP, y/y), when at the same time the euro area barely 
escaped defl ation with 0.3% annual infl ation in 2009.
Let us underscore what can be documented by a  broad survey of 
sources: Hungary has not entered a  crisis because of the spill-over of 
the global fi nancial crisis in the last quarter of 2008. Th e country was 
4 The infamous ‘lie speech’ of the then Premier in May 2006 – leaked to the press in Septem-
ber only – triggered 6 weeks of violent street protests, calmed down by the opposition 
by calling for referenda on social matters. The latter was won, by a majority of 85% on 9th 
March 2008. This would, in theory, have called for a  resignation of the government. But 
they were sticking to power, irrespective of the consequences – including their devastat-
ing defeat two years later and the annihilation of the two centrist formations, the heroes of 
early transition years, MDF and SZDSZ.
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already on a slowing track from 2004 onwards and the growth in 2004-
2006 could only be sustained owing to the accumulation of external 
debt. In 2006-2008 adjustment did happen, but structural and institu-
tional weaknesses have not been remedied. Th e government produced 
a large number of reform projects, but their implementation was in re-
verse order to the breadth of the initiatives, covering all walks of life. 
By contrast, the caretaking Bajnai government did address some of the 
overdue issues. Th ese included the increase in retirement age, cutting 
disability and early retirement schemes, cutting central administration 
and severing tax collection. Th ese measures have, for a variety of rea-
sons, survived the change of government and have been intensifi ed by 
the Széll Kálmán Plans – no 1 and no 2 – of the centre-right government 
in 2010-2012.
2. Infl ated expectations – improvised solutions
As follows from the sketchy overview produced above, the centre-right 
attained a landslide victory in 2010. In an unprecedented manner, they 
won both the national and municipal elections with a convenient mar-
gin, in theory allowing the new coalition to do whatever they wished in 
terms of change, reform, restructuring.
‘Life is not as it is in books’. First, a double majority implied that the 
most diffi  cult items of public fi nance, relating to municipalities, welfare 
provision, public fi rms and the like could not be easily touched upon as 
fellow party-members were running those too. Second, already by June 
2010, i.e., upon the formation of the new government, the external en-
vironment had turned quite sour. Th e allies of the country, who were 
funding it under the still running IMF/EU stand-by agreement made 
no secret of judging the government on its fi scal conservatism. While 
one may puzzle on the theoretical rationale of the insistence, the evolv-
ing Greek crisis and the new rescue package and related items5 have 
clearly dominated over country-specifi c considerations or considera-
5 J. Featherstone, The Greek sovereign debt crisis and EMU: a failing state in a skewed regime, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 49, 2011, No. 2, pp. 193-217; see also: A. Visvizi, The 
crisis in Greece and the EU/IMF rescue package: determinants and pitfalls, Acta Oeconomica, 
Vol. 62, 2012, No. 1, pp. 15-40.
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tions of the business cycle. European governance gradually learned new 
forms of tight coordination, such as the European Semester and many 
others. Withdrawal of EU funds from fi scal trespassers was mandated.
Th e second Orbán government was taken by surprise as the above 
events unfolded. Th eir original platform included major restructuring, 
even at the cost of temporary fi scal deterioration, in line with interna-
tional experience. While it was supposed to run to 7%, which would 
have been in line with the 6.6% actually achieved in the EU-27 in 2010, 
this idea was considered by the EU Commission as a dangerous derail-
ment, as a drift  toward populism. Th erefore – also by virtue of the terms 
of the inherited stand-by agreement – the room for manoeuvre has 
been narrowed.
Th e surprise component is perhaps the strongest single explanatory 
factor of what was later termed ‘unorthodox policy measures’. Th e gov-
ernment resorted to a  series of poorly prepared, improvised measures 
in order to meet the stringent defi cit criterion of 3.8%6. Th ese included 
raising the value added tax during the calendar year, cutting expendi-
ture items, and not least nationalizing the previously compulsory pri-
vate pillar in the pension system. Th e latter generated sizable revenues 
for 2010 and even more for 2011, thus allowing the country to record 
a headline surplus (sic!) of 4.3%. Th e ratio of public debt to GDP grew 
only slightly, i.e. to 81.3% by 2010 and started to decline to 79.3% in 2011, 
further declining somewhat in 20127. Sectoral taxes were imposed, both 
in 2010 and 2011, on banks, retail chains, the pharmaceutical industry 
and telecommunications. Th ese did generate revenues; however, they 
were distortive and one-shot measures, heavily criticized not only by 
the European Commission but also by top politicians from France, Aus-
tria and Germany, intervening in favour of their respective banks and 
corporations, both directly and at the EU fora.
While these measures did suffi  ce to make both ends meet, broader 
restructuring – such as re-tailoring public administration or of public 
fi rms, especially in the transport sector – fell victim to the pressure of 
daily fi scal improvements. As global and European upswing gave way 
to stagnation and uncertainty, especially on the fi nancial markets, con-
ditions for growth and the ensuing improvement of the employment 
6 The actual fi nal number was 4.2%, an innocent slip against the major deviations in Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, but also in France and the UK in 2010-2011.
7 These numbers are extremely sensitive to exchange rate volatility, which has indeed been 
a problem for Hungary during the entire period of scrutiny.
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situation failed to materialize. Especially the latter proved painful, with 
Hungarian unemployment rates – traditionally way below EU standards 
– reaching the EU average of 11% and getting stuck. Th is happened at 
a time when the centre-right government was elected on a ballot prom-
ising to create 1 million new jobs in a decade. In the fi rst two years, only 
80 thousand were created, a mere four per cent. Th is of course created 
serious social strains and disenchantment, especially among the young, 
the better qualifi ed and the more mobile. Th e comprehensive country 
report of the OECD8 has rightly stressed the lack of employment and 
employability as one of the major structural weaknesses in the Hungar-
ian economy, which is to be seen at the root of the fragility of fi scal im-
provements in the medium term and beyond.
3. The return of the IMF/EU tandem in shadow boxing
It could be seen from the sketchy overview above that the relationship 
of the centre-right government and the international organizations has 
been strained from the very outset. Th e idea to disregard fi scal targets 
angered the IMF. In return, the Hungarian government launched what 
it called a  “freedom fi ght” and, in one of its fi rst moves in June 2010, 
terminated the stand-by agreement of 2008. . Simultaneously, the con-
fl ictual relationship with the European Commission intensifi ed. Th is 
happened in part owing to disagreements over the economic strategy 
implemented, and in – perhaps larger – part, due to dissimilar ap-
proaches to a series of non-economic issues, including retroactive legis-
lation, media laws and changes in the judiciary system. Th e adoption of 
the new Basic Law of Hungary, making references to the Christian roots 
of the nation, supporting explicitly the concept of marriage as a liaison 
between man and woman only, as well as making historic and emo-
tional references, stirred heated debates in the European Parliament, 
whose co-decision powers have been considerably extended by the Lis-
bon Treaty of 2009. Also the Commission saw the crisis management 
as a window of opportunity to enhance its own infl uence at the expense 
of national governments.Th is is particularly true given the fact that the 
Lisbon Treaty called the Commission the guardian of all European val-
8 OECD, Hungary – March 2012, OECD Economic Surveys, Paris 2012.
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ues. Accordingly, Brussels sought to interpret its own prerogatives in 
an extensive manner. While the process of severing fi scal and banking 
regulations has gradually reinforced the federalist elements9 in the insti-
tutional structure of the EU, in the debate over who is compelled to do 
what and when anything is but settled. For instance, the Commission’s 
initiative of January 2012 to withhold cohesion funds from Hungary was 
seen as legitimate in terms of the Six-Pack package on fi scal stringency 
adopted only two months earlier. However, the subject of the contro-
versy was not an actual statistical fi gure, but a forecast for 2013, i.e., an 
event yet to be materialized. While the Commission did not consider 
the Hungarian measures suffi  ciently sustainable, the Hungarian govern-
ment disagreed. Th e solution came in May 2012 when the new medium-
term fi scal plan, integrated in the more general Széll Kálmán 2.0 Plan, 
convinced the Commission’s experts of the plausibility of sustainable 
improvements.
Th e government was forced to request an IMF/EU rescue package 
in mid-November 2011. It happened as the Greek crisis escalated, once 
again triggering tremors reaching from Spain to Romania, all across the 
European periphery. Th e exchange rate of the forint plummeted from 
280 Ft/euro to 323 Ft/euro; spreads, bond yields and CDS skyrocketed. 
Hungarian government bonds were sold at close to 11% yield in a coun-
try that recorded growth of only 1.1% on a year-to-year basis10. Under 
the panic generally ruling in Europe an IMF/EU rescue package, whose 
nature was unspecifi ed, was asked for.
Oddly enough, while the IMF was quick to fi x the real crisis cases, 
such as Bosnia, Belarus, Egypt and even Spain, negotiations with Hun-
gary tiptoed until 17 July 2012, when a  delegation of the creditors ar-
rived in Budapest. One may wonder why it took 7 months to get down 
to business. Th e answer lies in the changing role of the European Union.
Th e EU as it stands today is far more than a  free trade area with 
a single currency, as portrayed in the British press. Th e EU has devel-
oped into a  truly political institution with wide-ranging prerogatives 
in a number of areas, from social policy to environmental protection, 
deciding over legal claims and sustaining peace in Macedonia. It is far 
from settled in legal and political terms how far the EU can go in ap-
9 H. Berger et al., Euro Area Policies – Selected Issues, IMF Country Report, No. 12/182, Washing-
ton DC, 03.07.2012, off ers an analytical overview of major issues.
10 Even if we consider that the rate of forint infl ation was close to 5%, the real rate of interest 
far exceeded the rate of growth, which is clearly unsustainable in the long run.
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plying the community method, i.e., supranational prerogatives. Some 
considered it a too far reaching method even before the adoption of the 
Fiscal Compact of March 2012 and the European Stability Mechanism 
in June 201211. Just because of the unsettled nature of aff airs, the Com-
mission does have a leeway, much greater than conventionally, in re-in-
terpreting its own prerogatives and deciding over its own competences. 
In this case, the Commission clearly wished to signal its eagerness to ex-
haust in full the potential vested in it by the European Semester, by the 
Six-Pack package and the Fiscal Compact, as well as the cross-border 
banking regulations. Th ese constitute the fi scal discipline component, 
against which net contributors, from Germany to Finland, agreed to 
soft en the stance on the mutualisation of debts, issuing Eurobonds and 
targeting the bailout of Spanish banks, originally prohibited by the stat-
utes of the ECB.
Given that the Greek drama was far from over, it was further com-
plemented by the Spanish and Romanian cases, with Italy  suff ering 
continuously from distrust of the markets due to its exorbitant – close 
to 123% – debt/GDP ratio, and by May 2012 time had come to discon-
tinue the play for the general audience. While the question-marks on 
Hungarian fi scal sustainability have not been fully addressed, the Com-
mission agreed – following a visit by the Hungarian Premier to Brus-
sels in May 2012 – to launch negotiations in substance. It happened later 
with the 8 weeks of additional delay refl ecting the remaining discontent.
In short, although the seven month of wrestling may be considered 
an insubstantial issue, it played an important role in putting the Hun-
garian credit deal eventually on the agenda. While jabs were big, pain 
was next to nil, with Hungary remaining on the international capital 
markets, while Cyprus, quite unexpectedly, collapsed in June 2012.
4. Assessment and outlook
As we have seen, the evolving crisis of the EMU – especially in terms of 
governance – has implied an external shock par excellence for the Hun-
11 For an extensive review of those doubts see: F. Scharpf, Monetary union, fi scal crisis and the 
pre-emption of democracy, Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften, Vol. 9, 2011, No. 
2, pp. 163-198.
Hungary and the eurozone crisis: a comedy of errors? 41
garian economy and policy-making all over the period of 2008-2012. 
Th e spill-over of the global fi nancial crisis triggered the bailout package. 
Later, the indecisiveness in managing the Greek debt created animosi-
ties within the EU. Finally, the return to the umbrella of the IMF/EU 
twins proved to be more of style than of substance. Th e evolving new 
governance structures in the European Union pose new challenges to 
managing economic matters in Hungary as well. Th e idea of a fi scal and 
banking union to be fi nalized by December 2012 is a tall order, both on 
its own as well as in terms of its implications for the country proper.
We do not share the view of doomsayers, fantasizing about the 
breakup of the eurozone. If we consider that ever since the launch of the 
European Monetary System – with very few exceptions – fi xed exchange 
rate regimes have survived for over three decades, we do not see any 
reason to expect a major reversal. A peg sustaining decades – as it was 
the case of the Belgian Franc or the Dutch guilder against the D-Mark 
– makes the diff erence across currencies purely notional. Outsourcing 
monetary policy to a  supranational authority, shielded from political 
interventions – be that from Oskar Lafontaine or Silvio Berlusconi – 
has proven to be a major success, contributing to the broadening of the 
scope of the single market. Th ose with good macroeconomic indicators 
– as Finland or Slovakia – profi t from being part of a big market and 
are freed of the labours of sustaining price stability. Th ose with major 
problems – such as the southern cone or Ireland – would follow suicidal 
policies if they were to opt for re-introducing their former weak cur-
rencies, which would depreciate, thus sending asset prices to the cellar. 
Selling out the country in response to changed price signals is thought 
a text-bookish example, but watching the news coming from the Medi-
terranean would advise anybody against buying this pale wisdom as 
a policy relevant consideration. Furthermore it is quite evident that it is 
trespassers – and not those playing by the rules – that ran into trouble.
From this angle we may well ask if Hungary should still strive for 
joining the single currency as long as its architecture seems to be in cri-
sis. Recent analyses12 unanimously favour meeting the criteria. Not pri-
marily for obtaining the advantages of the single currency, but because 
of the obvious benefi ts accruing from the macroeconomic framework 
which is conducive to sustainable public fi nances and price stability. Th e 
latter may serve as a major pre-condition for reviving growth.
12 J. Neményi, G. Oblath, Az euró bevezetésének újragondolása [Rethinking the adoption of the 
euro], Közgazdasági Szemle, Vol. 59, 2012, No. 6, pp. 569-684, with 13 comments by experts.
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Let us note that Hungary has never been closer to meeting the Maas-
tricht criteria than today. Th e commitment to keep defi cits below 3% 
of GDP as well as the continuous fall of debt/GDP ratio is anchored in 
the new Basic Law of 2011. Th is arrangement is being enforced by a new 
Fiscal Council, composed of the governor of the central bank, the chair 
of the State Audit Offi  ce and a  respectable university professor, who 
served 9 years as vice chair and 9 years as chair of the state audit offi  ce13. 
Moreover, the strategy of the government is explicitly built on reduc-
ing the debt rate in order to render public fi nances sustainable. Th e cur-
rent account has been in surplus for the fourth consecutive year. Under 
peace times the rate of exchange is relatively stable between 290 and 270 
Fts per euro. Real rates of interest are historically not high, roughly 1.5% 
in Fts terms. Th e weak point is infl ation, running close to 6% in 2012, 
refl ecting the costs of delayed price adjustments in administered prices 
as well as increases in indirect taxes designed to raise fi scal revenue. Th e 
convergence plan, if its targets were delivered, would allow meeting all 
the Maastricht criteria by the end of 2014, rendering the adoption of the 
single currency by Hungary feasible by 2016, i.e. aft er a preparation of 
two years.
It should be noted, however, that the government is less than enthu-
siastic about this idea. Having burnt its fi ngers repeatedly – with the 
fi rst euro target date being 2006, declared by the fi rst Orbán govern-
ment in 2001 – caution rules. Following the examples of Poland and the 
Czech Republic, the government does not intend to “hasten in the euro-
zone”, and wishes to sit out the outcomes of the solution of the crisis. 
Declarations of those responsible refer to 2020 and beyond as possible 
target date.
Let us note: the “convergence game” by its nature is an exercise lim-
ited by time. Governments and central banks may anchor expectations 
only if those are within reach for the median players – households, 
fi rms, capital market participants, investors, political parties and social 
partners alike. Given the decisive role of the electoral cycle, a deadline 
reaching beyond the mandate of the successor of the current govern-
ment cannot be taken seriously. Th us the possibility of anchoring expec-
tations and thereby launching virtuous circles is unlikely to materialize, 
due to lack of credibility and lack of foreseeable perspectives. Whenever 
13 The previous fi scal council, set up in 2009, was an independent research institute with per-
sonnel of about 60 highly qualifi ed analysts, including three academics. This body had no 
veto power and was abolished by the new majority in 2010.
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convergence games were played, be it the original D-Mark zone, or later 
the accession of the countries of the south and east, the precondition 
was the time constraint of 3-4 years at maximum.
Th erefore, we may come to a  paradoxical conclusion. On the one 
hand, Hungary is close to meeting EMU criteria. Being a small, open, 
vulnerable country, with exports and imports together accounting for 
more than 160% of GDP, it would greatly benefi t from joining the EMU. 
All the more so, as 70 plus % of external trade is transacted with EMU 
countries. On the other hand – not least owing to the procrastination 
and ups and downs in crisis management in 2008-2012 – the willingness 
as well as the credibility seems to be missing.
From this it also follows that Hungary is most likely to follow a less 
enthusiastic approach to the fi scal and banking union, as the tradition-
al alliance with Germany and the warming up of its relationship with 
France would suggest. While small countries, like the Netherlands or 
Belgium, or Ireland have tended to be in favour of more supranational-
ism and a strongest possible Commission to countervail threats inher-
ent in enhanced intergovernmentalism of the recent years, this situation 
is gradually on the change. Not least because of the ever growing fre-
quency of decisions taken in narrow informal groups, small members 
– from Estonia to Cyprus – tend to be more oft en caught foot dragging. 
Ireland with her recurring referenda on a  variety of issues is a  telling 
case in point.
Th erefore, it is both conceivable and probable that Hungary will take 
a more assertive stance than earlier, especially if forms of closer govern-
ance include more supervision without possibilities to ask for remedial 
actions. Th e recapitalization of Spanish banks in July 2012 included re-
structuring the supervision, re-allocation of competences to European 
organs and a  loss of control by fi scal authorities – and by implication, 
of elected MPs – over major expenditure elements and conditions for 
their realization in favour of European technocratic bodies. Th is is 
clearly a case indicated by Fritz Scharpf14 on hollowing democracy; thus 
old issues of accountability, transparency and burden sharing pop up, 
without however being resolved. Th erefore, the reserved attitude looks 
justifi ed. Hungarian banks did not have to resort to public internation-
al funding, as their Irish, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, Greek, Estonian 
and Cypriot counterparts. Th us the country has limited if any interest 
in transferring either regulatory or fi nancial sovereignty to a  banking 
14 F. Scharpf, Monetary union...
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union. Also in terms of public debt, while according to Eurostat 2012 
numbers for public debt were 88.2% for the eurozone and 83.4% for the 
EU-27, Hungarian indicators improved to 79%, as one of six exceptional 
cases15. Attempts to employ punishment for future misdeeds should be 
a warning sign to anyone.
15 As reported in: portfolio.hu, 23 July 2012 /online fi nancial daily, bilingual/
